The collapse of communist power in Eastern Europe bought both an opportunity as well as a requirement for reform of intelligence systems in the newly independent states. In the communist era, a security organization was all too often simply an instrument of domestic repression and intimidation rather than an instrument for making and implementing policy. Moreover, there was no meaningful distinction between the security services and the intelligence agencies that served the communist regimes. Therefore, it is essential that intelligence services in the newly independent states be seen as targets for reform within the context of national reforms aimed at creation of civil society.

Two specific themes have emerged as being particularly relevant for the effort to make intelligence services effective in their work and supportive of the national transformation. After enduring a disappointing immediate post-Soviet regime, Georgia’s Rose Revolution brought about a change that reflected this concern when it announced in 2004 that it would create a foreign intelligence service that would be a separate structure directly subordinated to the office of the Georgian President. Prior to this time, foreign intelligence was subordinated to the Ministry of Security. The first theme for intelligence reform is information sharing, an absolute necessity for security and intelligence services hoping to coordinate their work, avoid duplication of efforts, and establish their credibility. A second and closely related theme is the need to develop professional work standards. The services will never enjoy credibility in the absence of training programs to ensure that skilled professional direct their labors. This was a concern voiced by Mrs. Anna Zhvania, who became Head of the newly established Georgian Foreign Intelligence Special Services (FISS), when I met with her in Tbilisi in January, 2007. Zhvania was only one of a group of Western oriented Georgian credited with reducing corruption and increasing professionalism among the ranks of government officials.

**Intelligence Sharing**

In 1993, just two years after the collapse of the USSR, the attack on the World Trade Center raised questions about the adequacy of intelligence sharing concepts. Coordinated attacks on US embassies in Africa underscored the complaints about the nature of the “intelligence failures” which contributed to nations’ vulnerability to such attacks. These debates have called attention to the growing problems of uncontrolled migration, expanding drug traffic that, with increasing frequency, supports terrorist activities, the eased acquisition of WMD and other weapons, and trafficking in humans.
These growing problems share a common characteristic in that they are international and impact the international environment. Policy makers now recognize that cross border intelligence sharing is essential for the development of coherent strategies to respond to these new threats. The expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe has generated a series of new problems, each of which has had a security aspect. Few have been more compelling than the problem of how to develop an effective system of intelligence sharing and verification among the new as well as the old NATO members. Such a system should also accommodate Partnership for Peace participants as well as National Guard units.

A new concern for Western national security doctrine is the emergence of terrorism as a global challenge to the established political, economic, and social order. Attacks on Western embassies and consulates, such as the disastrous Libyan attack in September, 2012, will not be the last gasp of terrorist forces determined to bring about instability. Eastern Europe has not been immune to terrorist initiatives and political violence continues to inhibit the creation of stable post-communist systems. Ethnic and political divides which emerged in the USSR’s final years have not only persisted but have evolved into confrontations which are, with increasing frequency, of international importance. The Chechen conflict, initially seen as an internal Russian crisis, has become a threat to regional stability and a direct challenge to Georgian security. In 2012, George Maior, the director of Romania’s intelligence service, highlighted his country’s vulnerability now that is part of the anti-missile shield.

Security organizations in Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova have demonstrated a desire to work together after the demise of the USSR. Romania, likewise, has developed a number of relevant and promising reforms. Their initiatives such demonstrate an apparent willingness on the part of the region’s governments to take at least limited steps in addressing current deficiencies in intelligence sharing. The implementation of a system for successful and productive intelligence sharing between different agencies requires careful planning and diplomacy. In fact, the same is true even for sharing within a single agency. Working agreements must be established up the 'agency management hierarchy' with commitment and responsibility clearly set at every level so that who talks to whom and what response is required and how it is vetted for release is clearly defined.

In addressing NATO needs, several concerns are apparent. The first concern is to determine what intelligence it is that we wish to share. Most intelligence data can be placed into one of two basic categories. Among the more common information is that which can be categorized as routine and/or strategic. Information relating to the day to day activities of criminal organizations would be considered routine. The same is true for criminal undertakings such as money laundering, prostitution, or the sale and transfer of stolen merchandise. Monitoring of movements of terrorist agents would also be viewed as a routine matter. Information relating to long-term planning, of course, would be categorized as strategic. Generally, routine stratégic intelligence will not be as time critical as crisis intelligence.

Less common but of greater relevance for international order are those activities that relate to crisis situations. The sharing of crisis-related intelligence poses special
problems. One of the most visible problems is how to expedite the exchange of information between member states involved in the crisis. The urgency of the situation may, by itself, be sufficient to overcome some of the bureaucratic inertia that otherwise might inhibit intelligence sharing.

Crisis Intelligence may also require immediate access to expertise on chemical, biological or nuclear warfare, communications to command authority and involve police or military action including use of force with consequences reaching to highest political and national leadership. Crisis intelligence requires an immediate response to critical incidents such as a perceived CBR threat or an actual attack. Intelligence sharing can be advanced through the establishment of a crisis management team that would operate through an operations center that is constantly manned. The crisis management team leader should have broad authority to dispatch a first responder to the incident site under an on-scene commander. Intelligence or information would need to flow freely between the operations center team leader and the on-scene commander. The team leader should have ready access to specialists who would be on call to provide assistance whenever it was needed in response to an event.

A second concern is to identify any legal constraints on sharing such information. Such a determination requires an examination of the nature of relationships between the states to be involved in intelligence sharing. Both recent and long-term historical considerations will have a bearing on this aspect of our studies. For the East European states, there are numerous issues which have an impact of their relationships. Long-standing ethnic and border disputes frequently color those relationships in such a way as to inhibit the development of cooperative arrangements in all policy areas. Relationships between intelligence officers will have a major impact on how obstacles to intelligence sharing may be overcome.

It is important to recognize that no general, long term exchange agreement can be obtained. The nature of international relationships is such that the optimum solution is a series of specific exchange agreements for particular and well defined intelligence activity over a specific time intervals. This might be, for example, "Special Project X", etc. on an 'ad hoc' basis. "Points of Contact" with adequate knowledge and authority must be identified and maintained by all parties to these arrangements. Without appropriate current access and release authority no significant intelligence flows across agency or political boundaries, domestic or international. For convenience let us call this requirement "Current Access and Release Authority" or CARA. Where there is no CARA intelligence sharing is not possible. Understanding, planning, implementing and maintaining CARA is the most difficult and critical element of any intelligence sharing program. Establishing and maintaining CARA will require motivation, time and experience on the part of relevant officials within the entire community. CARA is usually conditional upon how intelligence is to be used and who will have access after its release. Security considerations will be imposed on both sides. Once released, intelligence may have severe constraints as to who will have access and know its source. There will have to be provisions for handling this material at all levels on both sides. A single mistake could result in an embarrassment that would destroy the CARA and create a barrier to creation of another.
One way of developing this kind of cooperation could be to hold a series of working sessions that would address the issue of intelligence sharing and verification within NATO’s membership and related organizations. An overall goal of these workshops should be to address intelligence sharing on two levels: the international and the internal or domestic. Such workshops could include as participants representatives of the law enforcement and intelligence community from relevant states. These representatives would be individuals with day to day responsibilities in this area and would be drawn primarily from the operational rather than the executive levels of their organizations.

**Professional Standards**

As noted above, in 2007, Mrs. Anna Zhvania, newly installed as Head of Georgia’s Foreign Intelligence Special Service (FISS) elaborated on the need for enhancing professional development among Georgia’s intelligence and security services. In January of that year, Mrs. Zhvania explained that, as part of the process of implementing Georgia’s democratization, she hoped to develop a new professional elite to conduct the work of her nation’s main intelligence organization. According to Zhvania, the Georgian intelligence community in general and FISS in particular enjoyed the services of many young people who were committed to the notions of professionalism as well as the values of a democratic society. The problem, she explained, was that the senior leadership positions were all too often occupied by individuals who were products of the Soviet system. Therefore, Mrs. Zhvania was determined to provide educational opportunities for the young specialists whom she saw as the eventual replacements for the old cadre of intelligence professionals.

As a first step in creating opportunities for professional development, Mrs. Zhvania arranged for a series of training sessions which she hosted in the FISS headquarters. Both FISS employees as well as analysts from Georgia’s Ministry of Interior attended this three day program in January, 2007. The second stage of this program was scheduled for May, 2007.

While Mrs. Zhvania was determined to modernize the FISS, she recognized that there was opposition to her reforms. The extent and intensity of this resistance became clear when Deputy Head of FISS, George Gabunia, assumed direction of the organization during Mrs. Zhvania’s long illness. Before creation of FISS, Gabunia served as Head of the Counterterrorist Center of the Ministry of Interior. In this capacity he stopped those reform efforts by confronting and threatening, with a pistol lying on his desk, personnel responsible for the 2007 sessions.

Eventually, Georgia renewed its commitment to reforming its intelligence service without George Gabunia who became Corporate Security Director at the Georgian Lottery Company. In 2008, ex-foreign minister Gela Bezhuashvili accepted the position as head of the Foreign Intelligence Special Service. Seen as a reformer, Bezhuashvili shared Mrs. Zhvania’s enthusiasm for improving Georgia’s intelligence services. Later in the year, the surprise Russian invasion underscored the need for such an improvement.
Conclusion

It is these experiences which support the operational assumption that overcoming the barrier to intelligence sharing is a continuous process. Success in this area will have a direct impact on efficient border management as well as on border security-military relationships. Long-term, continuing success will be dependent upon involvement by all relevant law enforcement and intelligence agencies in Eastern Europe, the NATO command structure, and key agencies associated with Partnership for Peace participants with the National Guard community.